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Advance Directives Under State Law
and Judicial Decisions
Judith Areen
Three years ago I first surveyed state court decisions and
laws governing the withholding or withdrawal of medical
treatment. 1 The decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health2 on June 25, 1990, makes it timely to review
again state law developments because a majority of the
Court announced in Cruzan that it will leave to the states
the question of what legal requirements may be imposed
on decisions to discontinue treatment for incompetent
patients.3 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
explained that the Court's deference to state decision-
making is grounded in the fact that "state courts have
available to them for decision a number of sources-state
constitution, statutes, and common law-which are not
available to us." 4 Although the opinion makes clear that
Missouri might have authorized the family of Nancy
Cruzan to decide to terminate medical treatment for her,
a majority of the Supreme Court refrained from holding
that Missouri is constitutionally required to do so. Mis-
souri and all other states are thus free to impose a
requirement that treatment cannot be withdrawn in the
absence of "clear and convincing" evidence of the
patient's wishes.
Nancy Cruzan, the young woman at the center of the
Supreme Court case, lost control of the car she was
driving one night in 1983 in Jasper County, Missouri. She
was discovered lying face down in a ditch without detec-
table cardiac or respiratory function. Permanent brain
damage generally results after six minutes without
oxygen.5 It was estimated that Cruzan was deprived of
oxygen for 12 to 18 minutes. Ultimately, she was diag-
nosed to be in a persistent vegetative state. 6 Although a
state trial court approved the request of the Cruzan
family to terminate her artificial hydration and nutrition,
the Supreme Court of Missouri by a divided vote reversed
that decision. The trial court found that Cruzan's "ex-
pressed thoughts at age twenty-five in a somewhat
serious conversation with a housemate friend that if sick
or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless
she could live at least halfway normally suggests that
given her present condition she would not wish to con-
tinue on with her nutrition and hydration." 7 By contrast,
the Missouri Supreme Court found the roommate's state-
ment to be "unreliable for the purpose of determining
[Cruzan's] intent" and held that her family was not
entitled to direct the termination of her treatment in the
absence of a living will or "clear and convincing, in-
herently reliable evidence absent here." 8
Justice Scalia both joined the majority opinion and
wrote a separate concurrence in which he praised states
for beginning to grapple with the issue of terminating
medical treatment through legislation. He also warned
the other justices of the Supreme Court against confusing
that effort "as successfully as we have confused the
enterprise of legislating concerning abortion-requiring
it to be conducted against a background of federal con-
stitutional imperatives that are unknown because they
are being newly crafted from Term to Term." 9 Five
justices thus have made clear that this area is not to be
constitutionalized. Like some limitations on abortion
after Webster's1 ° modification of Roe v. Wade,11
decisions concerning withholding or withdrawing life-
saving treatment are to be left to individual states for
resolution.
There was one point of exception to the majority
consensus in Cruzan on deference to the states. Justice
O'Connor, one of the five, in a separate concurrence
stated that states "may" be constitutionally required to
give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decision-
maker. 12 Justice Souter's views on this matter, as on
most, are not known. It is thus not clear whether the
Court has a majority of justices who would support
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Justice O'Connor's position.
With a majority of the Supreme Court determined to
withdraw from this area, we are left to discover the law
in the statutes and judicial decisions of 50 states and the
District of Columbia. That is never an easy matter-for
a legislature is free to reverse itself at any time-just as it
is free to ignore the position taken by all other states. The
statute at issue in Cruzan illustrates the point. Only
Missouri has to date erected as formidable a procedural
barrier to termination of treatment decisions. New York,
although it imposes a clear and convincing evidence
standard, 13 also permits the delegation of authority to a
proxy.14 In Maine, a court decision adopting a clear and
convincing evidence standard 15 was limited by legisla-
tion to permit family decision-making in all circumstan-
ces except those involving tube feeding. In those
instances, the patient must have written out his or her
intention to permit withdrawal. 16
State judicial and legislative activity in this area can
be organized into three general categories:
1.) states with living will statutes;
2.) states with statutes or court'decisions authoriz-
ing proxy decision-makers; and
3.) states with statutes or court decisions authoriz-
ing family decision-making in the absence of ad-
vance directives. 17
The general pattern with respect to living will legis-
lation has not changed much in recent years. In 1987, 39
states and the District of Columbia had living will
statutes. 18 Since then Minnesota and North Dakota have
enacted statutes for a total today of 41 states and the
District of Columbia.
Most of these statutes include fairly rigorous stand-
ards for preparing a binding directive. Many statutes
provide, for example, that a directive becomes binding
only if and when the patient is determined to be terminal-
ly ill-and typically that determination must be by more
than one physician. In some states, a directive is legally
binding only if, after the onset of terminal illness but
before the onset of incompetence (a fleeting moment for
some patients), the patient reaffirms the directive. In-
creasingly, physicians and lawyers alike have criticized
these statutory models both for their procedural obstacles
and for failing to make clear which forms of care are to
be foregone and in what circumstances. Part of the
problem, many have come to believe, is that it is difficult
to anticipate the full range of treatment decisions that
may have to be made for a specific patient. An increas-
ingly attractive choice for many individuals, therefore, is
to delegate to a proxy decision-maker the legal authority
to make health care decisions in the event the patient is
unable to make decisions himself or herself. In 1987, only
three states had statutes specifically directed to health
care decision-making, although all states had general
durable power of attorney statutes that are probably
adequate authority to empower a health care proxy
decision-maker. 19 Today 39 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes that either specifically
authorize such delegation or have general proxy statutes
that have been specifically interpreted to apply to health
care decisions. The expansion of authority is not as great
as the total number of states involved may suggest. Only
19 of the jurisdictions specifically authorize the proxy to
withdraw or withhold life-saving treatment. Maine, Min-
nesota and New York specify that the agent will have
authority to withdraw artificial hydration or nutrition
only if the authority is expressly delegated by the patient.
Almost every state now recognizes some form of
written advance directive, be it living wills or appoint-
ments of proxy decision-makers. The problem with direc-
tives is thus increasingly not legal as much as it is
practical: very few people prepare advance directives. In
her concurring opinion in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor
reported that only 15 percent of Americans surveyed in
1988 had a living will, although 56 percent had told
family members their wishes concerning the use of life-
sustaining treatment. 20 Professor Peggy Davis of New
York University Law School has underscored the
economic bias inherent in the data by noting that "few
of us can pick up the phone and instruct our trusts and
estates lawyer to draw up a living will." 2 1
Congress has now enacted legislation designed to
inform patients about their legal rights to execute ad-
vance directives. Under the Patient Self Determination
Act,22 all health care institutions are required as of
December, 1991, to provide each patient with written
information about his or her rights under state law
(whether statutory or as recognized by the courts of the
state) to make decisions concerning medical care includ-
ing the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical
treatment and the right to formulate advance directives.
Health care providers are further required to document
in the individual's medical record whether or not the
individual has executed an advance directive.
Even when the Act is in force, it is likely that many
individuals will still not prepare advance directives. For
one thing, the new Act is triggered only when someone
becomes a patient in a hospital-type setting. Particularly
for young accident victims like Nancy Cruzan, that may
be too late to prepare an advance directive. Fortunately,
a growing number of states have adopted legislation
directed to the problem of how best to make treatment
decisions for patients who have no advance directives.
The statutes generally authorize specified family mem-
bers to make health care decisions, including termination
of treatment. In 1987, only 16 states empowered families
to act (11 by statute and five by court decision). 23 Today,
there are 20. Interestingly, neither the majority opinion
nor the dissenters in Cruzan discussed these statutes,
although several of the state court decisions were men-
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Summary of Relevant State Laws1
October 1990
Living Will Legislation Durable Power of Attorney, Health Court Decisions and
Care Agents, Proxy Appointments Legislation Authorizing
Legislation and Court Decisions Family Members to
Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment
Alabama Alabama Natural Death Act, Ala. Code
22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10.
Alaska Alaska Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, Alaska Statutory Form Power of
Alaska Stat. 18.12.010 to 18.12.100. Attorney Act, Alaska Stat. 13.26.332
to 13.26.353.
Arizona Arizona Medical Treatment Decisions Arizona Powers of Attorney Act, Ariz. Rasmussen v Fleming,
Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 36-3201 to Rev. Stat. Ann. 14-5501 to 5502 as 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d
36-3210. interpreted by Rasmussen v. Fleming, 674(1987).
154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
Arkansas Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or LIVING WILL STATUTE Arkansas Rights of the
Permanently Unconscious Act, Ark. Stat. AUTHORIZES PROXY Terminally Ill or
Ann. 82-3801 to 82-3804. APPOINTMENTS. Permanently Unconscious
Act, 20-17-214.
California California Natural Death Act, Cal. California Statutory Form Durable In re Conservatorsbip of
Health & Safety Code 7185-7195. Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Drabick, 200 Cal. App.
Cal. Civil Code 2430 to 2444. 3d 185,245 Cal. Rptr.
840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
Colorado Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Colorado Powers of Attorney Act,
Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 15-18-101 to 15- Colo. Rev. Stat. 15-14-501 to 502 as
18-113. interpreted by In re Rodas, No.
86PR139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa County
Jan. 22, 1987, as modified, April 3,
1987).
Connecticut Connecticut Removal of Life Support Connecticut Removal of
Systems Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 19a- Life Support Systems Act,
570 to 19a-575. Connecticut General Stat.
19a-571.
Delaware Delaware Death with Dignity Act, Del. LIVING WILL STATUTE
Code Ann. tit. 16, 2501-2509. AUTHORIZES PROXY
APPOINTMENTS.
1. Prepared by Judith Areen, Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Jenifer Hartog, and Kathryn
WilberGeorgetown Law Center Class of 1992. We are grateful to the Society for the Right to Die for providing much of the back-
ground legal material used in compiling this summary.
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Living Will Legislation Durable Power of Attorney, Health Court Decisions and
Care Agents, Proxy Appointments Legislation Authorizing
Legislation and Court Decisions Family Members to
Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment
District of District of Columbia Natural Death Act District of Columbia Health Care D.C. Health Care
Columbia of 1981, D.C. Code Ann. 6-2421 to Decisions Act, D.C. Code Ann. 21- Decisions Act, D.C. Code
2430. 2201 to 2213. Ann. 21-2201.to 2213.
Florida Florida Life Prolonging Procedure Act, LIVING WILL STATUTE Florida Life Prolonging
Fla. Star. Ann., 765.01 to 765.15. AUTHORIZES PROXY Procedure Act, Fla. Stat.
APPOINTMENTS. Ann. 765.07.
Georgia Georgia Living Wills Act, Ga. Code Georgia Durable Power of Attorney for
Ann. 31-32-1 to 31-32-12. Health Care Act, Ga. Code 31-36-1 to
31-36-36.
Hawaii Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions LIVING WILL STATUTE
Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. 327D-1 to 327D- AUTHORIZES PROXY APPOINTS;
27. Hawaii Uniform Durable Power of
Attorney Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. 551D-1
to 551D-7.
Idaho Idaho Natural Death Act, Idaho Code LIVING WILL STATUTE
39-4501 to 39-4509. AUTHORIZES PROXY
APPOINTMENTS.
Illinois Illinois Living Will Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. Illinois Powers of Attorney for Health 2
ch. 110.5, 701-710. Care Act, IMl. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 1/2,
804-1 to 804-11.
Indiana Indiana Living Wills & Life Prolonging LIVING WILL STATUTE
Procedures Act, Ind. Code Ann. 16-8- AUTHORIZES PROXY
11-1 to 16-8-11-22. APPOINTMENTS.
Iowa Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LIVING WILL STATUTE Iowa life Sustaining
Iowa Code Ann. 144A.1 to 144A.1 1. AUTHORIZES PROXY Procedures Act, Iowa
APPOINTMENTS; Iowa Power of. Code Ann. 144A.7.
Attorney Act, Iowa Code 633.705 to
633.706.
Kansas Kansas Natural Death Act, Kansas Stat. Kansas Durable Power of Attorney for
Ann. 65-28, 101-128. Health Care Act, Kansas Stat. Ann. 58-
625-632.
Kentucky Kentucky Living Will Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Health Care Surrogate Act of
Ann. 311.622-644. Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 311.970-
986.
Louisiana Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures LIVING WILL STATUTE Louisiana Declarations
Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 40:1299.58.1 AUTHORIZES PROXY Concerning Life-
to 40:1299.58.10. APPOINTMENTS. Sustaining Procedures
Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
40:1299.58.5.
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Living Will Legislation Durable Power of Attorney, Health Court Decisions and
Care Agents, Proxy Appointments Legislation Authorizing
Legislation and Court Decisions Family Members to
Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment
Maine Maine Uniform Rights of the Terminally Maine Powers of Attorney Act, Me. Maine Uniform Rights of
Ill Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 18-A, 5- Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, 5-501. the Terminally Ill Act,
701 to 5-714. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
18-A, 5-707.
Maryland Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Maryland Durable Power of Attorney
Act, Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. 5-601- Act, Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. 13-
614. 601 to 603, as interpreted by 73
Opinions of the Attorney, General
[No. 88-046, 1988].
Massachu-
setts
Michigan
Minnesota Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions LIVING WILL STATUTE
Act, Minn. Stat. 145B.01 to 145B.17. AUTHORIZES PROXY
APPOINTMENTS.
Mississippi Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mississippi Durable Power of Attorney
Mechanisms Act, Miss. Code Ann. 41- for Health Care Act, Miss. Code Ann.
41-101 to 41-41-121. 41-41-151 to 41-41-183.
Missouri Missouri Life Support Declarations Act,
Mo. Rev. Stat. 459.010 to 459.055.
Montana Montana Living Will Act, Mont. Code
Ann. 50-9-101 to 50-9-104, 50-9-111,
50-9-201 to 50-9-206.
Nebraska
Nevada Nevada Withholding and Withdrawal of Nevada Durable Power of Attorney for
Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, Nev. Health Care Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Rev. Stat. 449.540 to 449.690. 449.800 to .860.
New New Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H.
Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 137 H.
New Jersey New Jersey Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 46:2B- In rejobes, 108 N. J. 394,
8, as interpreted by In re Peter, 108 529A. 2d. 434 (1987).
N.J. 365, 529 A. 2d 419 (1987).
New New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. New Mexico Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 45- New Mexico Right to Die
Mexico Stat. Ann. 24-7-1 to 24-7-11. 5-501 to 45-5-502. Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. 24-
7-8.1.
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Living Will Legislation Durable Power of Attorney, Health Court Decisions and
Care Agents, Proxy Appointments Legislation Authorizing
Legislation and Court Decisions Family Members to
Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment
New York New York Pub. Health Law 2980-
2994.
North North Carolina Right to Natural Death North Carolina Power of Attorney Act, North Carolina Right to
Carolina Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-320 to 90-322. N.C. Gen. Stat. 32A-8 to 14. Natural Death Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. 90-322.
North North Dakota Uniform Rights of the
Dakota Terminally Ill Act, N.D. Cent. Code
23.06.4-01 to 23.06.4-14.
Ohio Ohio Power of Attorney for Health
Care Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
1337.11 to 1337.17.
Oklahoma Oklahoma Natural Death Act, Okla.
Stat. tit. 63, 3101-3111.
Oregon Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Oregon Durable Power of Attorney for Oregon Rights with
Illness Act, Or. Rev. Stat. 97.050 to Health Care Act, Or. Rev. Stat. Respect to Terminal
97.090. 127.505 to 127.585. Illness Act, Or. Rev. Stat.
97.083.
Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Durable Powers of
Attorney Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20,
5604 to 5607.
Rhode Rhode Island Health Care Power of
Island Attorney Act, R.I. Gen. Laws 23-
4.10.1-2.
South South Carolina Death with Dignity Act,
Carolina S.C. Code Ann. 44-77-10 to 44-77-160.
South South Dakota Durable Powers of
Dakota Attorney Act, S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
59-7-2.1 to 4.
Tennessee Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, Tennessee Durable Power of Attorney
Tenn. Code Ann. 32-11-101 to 32-11- for Health Care, Tenn. Code Ann. tit.
110. 34, ch. 6.
Texas Texas Natural Death Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. LIVING WILL STATUTE Texas Natural Death Act,
Stat. Ann. art. 4590h. AUTHORIZES PROXY Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.,
APPOINTMENTS; + Texas Durable art 4590h- 4(c).
Power of Attorney for Health Care Act,
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4590h-1.
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Living Will Legislation Durable Power of Attorney, Health Court Decisions and
Care Agents, Proxy Appointments Legislation Authorizing
Legislation and Court Decisions Family Members to
Withhold or Withdraw
Treatment
Utah Utah Personal Choice and Living Will LIVING WILL STATUTE Utah Personal Choice and
Act, Utah Code Ann. 75-2-1101 to 75-2- AUTHORIZES PROXY Living Will Act, Utah
1118. APPOINTMENTS. Code Ann. 75-2-1105(2).
Vermont Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, Vermont Durable Power of Attorney
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, 5251-5262 and for Health Care Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
tit. 13, 1801. 14, 3451 to 3467.
Virginia Virginia Natural Death Act, Va. Code LIVING WILL STATUTE Virginia Natural Death
54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992. AUTHORIZES PROXY Act, Va. Code 54:1-2986.
APPOINTMENTS; Virginia Durable
Powers of Attorney for Health Care
Act, Va. Code 11-9.1 to 11-9.4.
Washington Washington Natural Death Act, Wash. LIVING WILL STATUTE In re Guardianship of
Rev. Code Ann. 70.122.010 to AUTHORIZES PROXY Grant, 109 Wash 2d. 545,
70.122.905. APPOINTMENTS; Washington 747 P. 2d 445 (1987),
Durable Power of Attorney - Health modified, 757 P. 2d 534
Care Decisions Act, Wash. Rev. Code (1988).
Ann. 11.94.010.
West West Virginia Natural Death Act, W.Va. West Virginia Medical Power of
Virginia Code 16-30-1 to 16-30-10. Attorney Act, W.Va. Code 16-30A-1
to 16-30A-20.
Wisconsin Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wisc. Wisconsin Power of Attorney for
Stat. Ann. 154.01 to 154.15. Health Care Act, 1989 Wisc. Act. 200.
Wyoming Wyoming Act, Wyo. Stat. 33-22-101 to LIVING WILL STATUTE
33-22-109. AUTHORIZES PROXY
APPOINTMENTS.
Note: Bolded material specifically includes or has been interpreted by a judicial decision to include decisions to withdraw or withhold
life support.
Table References
2. Family consent honored with judicial approval. In re
Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E. 2d. 292 (1989).
tioned in the Court's review of cases involving the right
to refuse life-saving treatment. The statutes and court
decisions empowering families to provide consent vary
considerably from state to state. Four aspects of the new
standards are worth consideration.
1. Qualifying Characteristics of the Patient
First, states differ as to which patients are covered. Of
3. Family consent honored with judicial approval. Bropby
v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.
2d 626 (1986).
4. Family consent honored if approved by hospital ethics
committee. In re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
the 13 states with statutes, ten specify that the patient
must be "terminally ill" or in a "terminal condition." The
nine court decisions, by contrast, apply to patients who
are comatose or in a persistent vegetative state. Nancy
Cruzan, who was in a persistent vegetative state, was not
considered terminally ill because she might have been
maintained in that state for many years. Thus even if
Nancy Cruzan had prepared a living will, in most states
the will would not have provided authority for terminat-
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ing her artificial nutrition.
2. Treatments that May Be Withheld or Withdrawn
Second, states vary with respect to the treatment that may
be withdrawn by families. Connecticut prohibits
withdrawing nutrition or hydration. Florida, Iowa and
Utah prohibit the withdrawing of "sustenance." Oregon
mandates "the usual and typical provision of nutrition
which in the medical judgment of the attending physician
a patient can tolerate."
The court decisions, by contrast, have generally held
that no distinction should be drawn between stopping
artificial hydration and nutrition and stopping any other
life-prolonging medical procedure.
3. Eligible Family Members
States also differ as to which family members are em-
powered to make decisions. Most establish a priority list
to be followed in obtaining consent from family mem-
bers. Typically, the statutes direct turning first to the
court-appointed guardian, if there is one, then to the
patient's spouse, then to the adult child (or a majority of
adult children if there are more than one), then to either
parent. Louisiana and Utah are careful enough to specify
that to be eligible the spouse must not be judicially
separated, and Texas adds that the spouse must be an
adult. Six of the states authorize turning as a last resort
to the patient's "nearest living relative." Iowa adds an
adult sibling to the list, Louisiana either a sibling or the
patient's other ascendant or descendants. Utah directs
resorting to parents before adult children. Connecticut
requires only the informed consent of the "next of kin, if
known."
Of the nine court opinions, only a handful have
grappled specifically with the problem of which family
members are authorized to make decisions for the
patient. The Washington State Supreme Court specified
the patient's immediate family must be consulted, and all
family members must agree with the decision. 24 Florida
specified that only close family members such as a spouse,
children, or parents are empowered to decide.25 Connec-
ticut empowers next of kin. In New Jersey, those family
members close enough to decide are a spouse, parents,
adult children or siblings. But if another relative, i.e. a
cousin, aunt, uncle, niece or nephew, functions in the role
of a patient's nuclear family, then that relative can and
should be treated as a close and caring family member. 26
4. Restraints on Abuse by Family Members
Most of the states that have adopted a form of family
decision-making have considered the risk that family
members might abuse their authority. Arkansas and
Louisiana, for example, direct that a family member is to
act "on behalf of the patient." Florida and Iowa mandate
family members are to be guided by the express or
implied intentions of the patient. Courts, too, -have grap-
pled with the issue. In California, a family member
should be guided first by his knowledge of the patient's
desires and feelings to the extent they were expressed, and
only as a last resort by the patient's best interests. All
courts have limited the harm that could be done by
restricting the authority of families to situations in which
the attending physician has determined that the person is
terminally ill or irretrievably comatose. Texas specifies
that two of the priority categories of eligible family
members must agree. In Washington State and New
Mexico, all available family members must agree.
In California the courts also require that there be no
evidence that the family were motivated in their decisions
by anything other than love and concern for the dignity
of their husband and father. 27
In summary, most states today honor at least one
form of advance directives, either living wills or durable
powers of attorney; many recognize both. For patients
without advanced directives, however, court authoriza-
tion must be sought to terminate treatment except in
those jurisdictions that authorize families to decide.
Justice Brennan in his dissent in Cruzan addressed
the discomfort some members of the Court felt on this
point by acknowledging that there is no automatic as-
surance that the view of close family members will neces-
sarily be the same as the patient's would have been had
she been confronted with the prospect of her situation
while competent. Brennan added, "I cannot quarrel with
this observation. But it leads to another question. Is there
any reason to suppose that a state is more likely to make
the choice a patient would have made than someone who
knew the patient intimately? To ask this is to answer it."
Brennan also noted that there are strong reasons why
someone who knew they would end up in Nancy
Cruzan's situation might want to forego artificial hydra-
tion and nutrition:
Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many,
the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is
abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity
intact, is a matter of extreme consequence. 28
To the extent reliance on families means faster and
less expensive decision-making with no diminution in the
quality of the decision made, family consent statutes
should be welcomed by patients, health care providers
and society alike. Family members are generally likely to
be in the best position to know the patient's views on
treatment even if no explicit statements were made. More
formal procedural mechanisms including court hearings
would probably rely primarily on the family for data
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about the patient's values and beliefs, moreover, thus
adding to the cost of decision-making with little if any
increase in quality.
But the trend toward reliance on families is not
without problems. The term "family" is certainly not
precise. When relatives disagree about the patient's
views, the dispute will probably require court resolution
in the absence of a statute that specifies which relative's
judgment is to be given priority. In some instances, the
family will not include the most knowledgeable proxy
decision-maker. Fortunately, individuals who wish to
ensure that a nonrelative speaks on their behalf have the
option in most states of preparing an advance directive
that designates the nonrelative as their proxy decision-
maker. Finally, there is the problem of protecting patients
from those few families who may act on the basis of bad
faith or ignorance. Some have suggested that all families
should be required to justify any decision to terminate
treatment to a hospital ethics committee or to a court. A
more respectful approach is to direct health care
providers to accept family decisions, as a growing num-
ber of states have done, except in those few instances
where there is reason to suspect that the family is acting
in bad faith or out of ignorance. Only these family
decisions should be referred to a hospital ethics commit-
tee or to court.
To date, those state courts and legislatures that have
addressed the issue have not only supported advance
directives, they have, with the exception of Missouri,
been very deferential to family decision-making even in
the absence of written directives. Cruzan means this issue
will not be resolved by the Supreme Court as a matter of
federal constitutional law, but will be left to the state
courts and to the political process in state legislatures. It
appears likely that few, if any, states will follow
Missouri's lead, but it may be a number of years before
most states explicitly authorize family decision-making
in the absence of written directives.
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vegetative state describes a body which is functioning en-
In the meantime, individuals can maximize the
likelihood that their wishes concerning treatment will be
followed whether they are at home or traveling away
from their home state, by preparing a written advance
directive. The directive should specify the patient's
wishes concerning termination of hydration and nutri-
tion in the event that they are either terminally ill or
irretrievably comatose. Ideally, the directive should also
specify a preferred proxy decision-maker and several
alternative decision-makers in the event that the
preferred proxy is unavailable. The procedural require-
ments in most states will be satisfied if the document is
witnessed by two adults unrelated to the patient. Copies
of the document should be given to one's physician and
to family members in order to maximize the chance that
health care providers will learn of the document even if
the patient is stricken away from home.
The Supreme Court in Cruzan has left patients and
families to face the uneven standards of state law con-
cerning decisions to terminate treatment for incompetent
patients. For many, the prospect of ending up like Nancy
Cruzan raises not only the possibility of the invasiveness
of life-sustaining systems, like nasogastric tubes, upon the
integrity of one's body, it also presents in the words of
one court "the utter helplessness of the permanently
comatose person, the wasting of a once strong body, and
the submission of the most private bodily functions to the
attention of others." 2 9  As Justice Brennan ob-
served,"such conditions are, for many, humiliating to
contemplate, as is visiting a prolonged and anguished
vigil on one's parents, spouse, and children." 30 Change
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